Non-governmental organizations and economic sanctionsi

Youngwan Kim, Taehee Whang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

How do non-governmental organizations (NGOs) affect sanction policies? Using two datasets of sanctions and NGOs, we study whether and how US-based NGOs working in a target state can influence the threat and implementation of sanctions initiated by the USA. At the threat stage, the sender government tends to perceive NGOs as a signaling device such that NGOs increase the probability of sanction threat. At the imposition stage, the presence of NGOs in a target state also increases the likelihood of a sender state imposing sanctions. In addition, the sender state tends to implement costly sanctions when NGOs have more field operations in target states. This study provides a systematic explanation of the relationship between NGOs and sanction threat and implementation.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)209-224
Number of pages16
JournalInternational Political Science Review
Volume39
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Mar 1

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sanction
economics
threat

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

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Non-governmental organizations and economic sanctionsi . / Kim, Youngwan; Whang, Taehee.

In: International Political Science Review, Vol. 39, No. 2, 01.03.2018, p. 209-224.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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