How do non-governmental organizations (NGOs) affect sanction policies? Using two datasets of sanctions and NGOs, we study whether and how US-based NGOs working in a target state can influence the threat and implementation of sanctions initiated by the USA. At the threat stage, the sender government tends to perceive NGOs as a signaling device such that NGOs increase the probability of sanction threat. At the imposition stage, the presence of NGOs in a target state also increases the likelihood of a sender state imposing sanctions. In addition, the sender state tends to implement costly sanctions when NGOs have more field operations in target states. This study provides a systematic explanation of the relationship between NGOs and sanction threat and implementation.
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
Y. Kim’s work was supported by Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Research Fund. T. Whang’s work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2013S1A3A2055081).
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Sociology and Political Science
- Political Science and International Relations