On explaining why time seems to pass

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Usually, the B-theory of time is taken to involve the claim that time does not, in reality, pass; after all, on the B-theory, nothing really becomes present and then more and more past, times do not come into existence successively, and which facts obtain does not change. For this reason, many B-theorists have recently tried to explain away one or more aspect(s) of experience that they and their opponents take to constitute an experience of time as passing. In this paper, I examine three prominent proposals of this kind and argue that, though intriguing, the proposals undermine, to some extent, the assumption that there is an element of experience that B-theorists need to take to be illusory.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)367-382
Number of pages16
JournalSouthern Journal of Philosophy
Volume51
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013 Sep 1

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Theorists
B-theory
Opponents

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy

Cite this

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On explaining why time seems to pass. / Deng, Natalja.

In: Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 51, No. 3, 01.09.2013, p. 367-382.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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