Abstract
Usually, the B-theory of time is taken to involve the claim that time does not, in reality, pass; after all, on the B-theory, nothing really becomes present and then more and more past, times do not come into existence successively, and which facts obtain does not change. For this reason, many B-theorists have recently tried to explain away one or more aspect(s) of experience that they and their opponents take to constitute an experience of time as passing. In this paper, I examine three prominent proposals of this kind and argue that, though intriguing, the proposals undermine, to some extent, the assumption that there is an element of experience that B-theorists need to take to be illusory.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 367-382 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Southern Journal of Philosophy |
| Volume | 51 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2013 Sep 1 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Philosophy
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On explaining why time seems to pass. / Deng, Natalja.
In: Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 51, No. 3, 01.09.2013, p. 367-382.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - On explaining why time seems to pass
AU - Deng, Natalja
PY - 2013/9/1
Y1 - 2013/9/1
N2 - Usually, the B-theory of time is taken to involve the claim that time does not, in reality, pass; after all, on the B-theory, nothing really becomes present and then more and more past, times do not come into existence successively, and which facts obtain does not change. For this reason, many B-theorists have recently tried to explain away one or more aspect(s) of experience that they and their opponents take to constitute an experience of time as passing. In this paper, I examine three prominent proposals of this kind and argue that, though intriguing, the proposals undermine, to some extent, the assumption that there is an element of experience that B-theorists need to take to be illusory.
AB - Usually, the B-theory of time is taken to involve the claim that time does not, in reality, pass; after all, on the B-theory, nothing really becomes present and then more and more past, times do not come into existence successively, and which facts obtain does not change. For this reason, many B-theorists have recently tried to explain away one or more aspect(s) of experience that they and their opponents take to constitute an experience of time as passing. In this paper, I examine three prominent proposals of this kind and argue that, though intriguing, the proposals undermine, to some extent, the assumption that there is an element of experience that B-theorists need to take to be illusory.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84884327325&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84884327325&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/sjp.12033
DO - 10.1111/sjp.12033
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84884327325
VL - 51
SP - 367
EP - 382
JO - Southern Journal of Philosophy
JF - Southern Journal of Philosophy
SN - 0038-4283
IS - 3
ER -