On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules

Yaron Azrieli, Semin Kim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

A voting rule f is self-stable (Barberà and Jackson, 2004) if any alternative rule g does not have sufficient support in the society to replace f, where the decision between f and g is based on the rule f itself. While Barberà and Jackson focused on anonymous rules in which all agents have the same voting power, we consider here the larger class of weighted majority rules. Our main result is a characterization of self-stability in this setup, which shows that only few rules of a very particular form satisfy this criterion. This result provides a possible explanation for the tendency of societies to use more conservative rules when it comes to changing the voting rule. We discuss self-stability in this latter case, where a different rule F may be used to decide between f and g.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)376-389
Number of pages14
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume100
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016 Nov 1

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Voting rules
Majority rule
Voting power

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules. / Azrieli, Yaron; Kim, Semin.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 100, 01.11.2016, p. 376-389.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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