On the thermal attack in instruction caches

Joonho Kong, Johnsy K. John, Eui Young Chung, Sung Woo Chung, Jie Hu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The instruction cache has been recognized as one of the least hot units in microprocessors, which leaves the instruction cache largely ignored in on-chip thermal management. Consequently, thermal sensors are not allocated near the instruction cache. However, malicious codes can exploit the deficiency in this empirical design and heat up fine-grain localized hotspots in the instruction cache, which might lead to physical damages. In this paper, we show how instruction caches can be thermally attacked by malicious codes and how simple techniques can be utilized to protect instruction caches from the thermal attack.

Original languageEnglish
Article number5465864
Pages (from-to)217-223
Number of pages7
JournalIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Volume7
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010 May 31

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Temperature control
Microprocessor chips
Sensors
Hot Temperature

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Kong, Joonho ; John, Johnsy K. ; Chung, Eui Young ; Chung, Sung Woo ; Hu, Jie. / On the thermal attack in instruction caches. In: IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing. 2010 ; Vol. 7, No. 2. pp. 217-223.
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On the thermal attack in instruction caches. / Kong, Joonho; John, Johnsy K.; Chung, Eui Young; Chung, Sung Woo; Hu, Jie.

In: IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, Vol. 7, No. 2, 5465864, 31.05.2010, p. 217-223.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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