Optimal compatibility in systems markets

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We investigate private and social incentives for standardization to ensure market-wide system compatibility in a two-dimensional spatial competition model. We develop a new methodology to analyze competition on a torus and show that there is a fundamental conflict of interests between consumers and producers over the standardization decision. Consumers prefer standardization with full compatibility because it offers more variety that confers a better match with their ideal specifications. However, firms are likely to choose the minimal compatibility to maximize product differentiation and soften competition. This is in sharp contrast to the previous literature that shows the alignment of private and social incentives for compatibility.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)106-118
Number of pages13
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume90
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015 Mar 1

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Compatibility
Standardization
Incentives
Methodology
Conflict of interest
Alignment
Product differentiation
Spatial competition

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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Optimal compatibility in systems markets. / Kim, Sang-Hyun; Choi, Jay Pil.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 90, 01.03.2015, p. 106-118.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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