Our Experience of Passage on the B-Theory

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Elsewhere I have suggested that the B-theory includes a notion of passage, by virtue of including succession. Here, I provide further support for that claim by showing that uncontroversial elements of the B-theory straightforwardly ground a veridical sense of passage. First, I argue that the B-theory predicts that subjects of experience have a sense of passivity with respect to time that they do not have with respect to space, which they are right to have, even according to the B-theory. I then ask what else might be involved in our experience of time as passing that is not yet vindicated by the B-theoretic conception. I examine a recent B-theoretic explanation of our 'illusory' sense of passage, by Robin Le Poidevin, and argue that it explains away too much: our perception of succession poses no more of a problem on the B-theory than it does on other theories of time. Finally, I respond to an objection by Oreste Fiocco that a causal account of our sense of passage cannot succeed, because it leaves out the 'phenomenological novelty' of each moment.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)713-726
Number of pages14
JournalErkenntnis
Volume78
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013 Aug 1

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Passivity
Experience
B-theory
Moment
Predict
Novelty
Causal
Conception
Perception

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy
  • Logic

Cite this

Deng, Natalja. / Our Experience of Passage on the B-Theory. In: Erkenntnis. 2013 ; Vol. 78, No. 4. pp. 713-726.
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Our Experience of Passage on the B-Theory. / Deng, Natalja.

In: Erkenntnis, Vol. 78, No. 4, 01.08.2013, p. 713-726.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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