Pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules

Yaron Azrieli, Semin Kim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

15 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider the design of decision rules in an environment with two alternatives, independent private values and no monetary transfers. The utilitarian rule subject to incentive compatibility constraints is a weighted majority rule, where agents' weights correspond to expected gains given that their favorite alternative is chosen. It is shown that a rule is interim incentive efficient if and only if it is a weighted majority rule, and we characterize those weighted majority rules that are ex ante incentive efficient. We also discuss efficiency in the class of anonymous mechanisms and the stability of weighted majority rules.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1067-1088
Number of pages22
JournalInternational Economic Review
Volume55
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Nov 1

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Pareto efficiency
Majority rule
Incentives
Decision rules
Incentive compatibility
Independent private values

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Azrieli, Yaron ; Kim, Semin. / Pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules. In: International Economic Review. 2014 ; Vol. 55, No. 4. pp. 1067-1088.
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Pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules. / Azrieli, Yaron; Kim, Semin.

In: International Economic Review, Vol. 55, No. 4, 01.11.2014, p. 1067-1088.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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