Pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules

Yaron Azrieli, Semin Kim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

23 Citations (Scopus)


We consider the design of decision rules in an environment with two alternatives, independent private values and no monetary transfers. The utilitarian rule subject to incentive compatibility constraints is a weighted majority rule, where agents' weights correspond to expected gains given that their favorite alternative is chosen. It is shown that a rule is interim incentive efficient if and only if it is a weighted majority rule, and we characterize those weighted majority rules that are ex ante incentive efficient. We also discuss efficiency in the class of anonymous mechanisms and the stability of weighted majority rules.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1067-1088
Number of pages22
JournalInternational Economic Review
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Nov 1

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© (2014) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics


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