Partisan advocates

Chulyoung Kim

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8586.2012.00448.x

Partisan advocates

Chulyoung Kim

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies the problem of an uninformed decision maker who acquires expert advice prior to making a decision. I show that it is less costly to hire partisan agents than impartial agents, especially under advocacy, and that the decision maker prefers partisan advocacy to other forms of institutions. I also extend the literature, originating with Dewatripont and Tirole , to a setting with contracts that condition on information provided and not just the decision made.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	313-332
Number of pages	20
Journal	Bulletin of Economic Research
Volume	66
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2012.00448.x
Publication status	Published - 2014 Oct 1

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2012 Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1111/j.1467-8586.2012.00448.x

Cite this

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AB - This paper studies the problem of an uninformed decision maker who acquires expert advice prior to making a decision. I show that it is less costly to hire partisan agents than impartial agents, especially under advocacy, and that the decision maker prefers partisan advocacy to other forms of institutions. I also extend the literature, originating with Dewatripont and Tirole , to a setting with contracts that condition on information provided and not just the decision made.

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Partisan advocates

Abstract

Bibliographical note

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Access to Document

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