Partisan advocates

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies the problem of an uninformed decision maker who acquires expert advice prior to making a decision. I show that it is less costly to hire partisan agents than impartial agents, especially under advocacy, and that the decision maker prefers partisan advocacy to other forms of institutions. I also extend the literature, originating with Dewatripont and Tirole , to a setting with contracts that condition on information provided and not just the decision made.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)313-332
Number of pages20
JournalBulletin of Economic Research
Volume66
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Jan 1

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Advocacy
Decision maker

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Kim, Chulyoung. / Partisan advocates. In: Bulletin of Economic Research. 2014 ; Vol. 66, No. 4. pp. 313-332.
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Partisan advocates. / Kim, Chulyoung.

In: Bulletin of Economic Research, Vol. 66, No. 4, 01.01.2014, p. 313-332.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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