Patent pools, litigation, and innovation

Jay Pil Choi, Heiko Gerlach

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This article analyzes patent pools and their effects on litigation incentives, overall royalty rates, and social welfare when patent rights are probabilistic and can be invalidated in court. With probabilistic patents, the license fees reflect the strength of the patents. We show that patent pools of complementary patents can be used to discourage infringement by depriving potential licensees of the ability to selectively challenge patents and making them committed to a proposition of all-or-nothing in patent litigation. If patents are sufficiently weak, patent pools with complementary patents reduce social welfare as they charge higher licensing fees and chill subsequent innovation incentives.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)499-523
Number of pages25
JournalRAND Journal of Economics
Volume46
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015 Sep 1

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Innovation
Litigation
Patents
Patent pool
Social welfare
Incentives
Fees
Patent infringement
Licensing
Infringement
Patent rights
License
Royalty
Charge

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Choi, Jay Pil ; Gerlach, Heiko. / Patent pools, litigation, and innovation. In: RAND Journal of Economics. 2015 ; Vol. 46, No. 3. pp. 499-523.
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Patent pools, litigation, and innovation. / Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko.

In: RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 46, No. 3, 01.09.2015, p. 499-523.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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