Playing to the home crowd? Symbolic use of economic sanctions in the United States

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

39 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Why do we observe economic sanctions despite strong doubts regarding their effectiveness? While the symbolic use of sanctions is advanced as an alternative to the instrumental use explanation, no one has assessed this alternative explanation empirically. I investigate the symbolic use of sanctions for domestic political gain in the United States, assessing in particular the effect of sanctions imposition on US presidential approval ratings. Findings suggest that policymakers benefit from imposing sanctions through increased domestic support. This domestic political gain can present policymakers with an incentive to use sanctions as a low-cost way of displaying strong leadership during international conflicts.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)787-801
Number of pages15
JournalInternational Studies Quarterly
Volume55
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011 Sep 1

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economic sanction
sanction
International Conflicts
rating
incentive
leadership
present
costs

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

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Playing to the home crowd? Symbolic use of economic sanctions in the United States. / Whang, Taehee.

In: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 3, 01.09.2011, p. 787-801.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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