Potential games with incomplete preferences

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Abstract

This paper studies potential games allowing the possibility that players have incomplete preferences and empty best-response sets. We define four notions of potential games, ordinal, generalized ordinal, best-response, and generalized best-response potential games, and characterize them using cycle conditions. We study Nash equilibria of potential games and show that the set of Nash equilibria remains the same when every player's preferences are replaced with the smallest generalized (best-response) potential relation or a completion of it. Similar results are established about strict Nash equilibria of ordinal and best-response potential games. Lastly, we examine the relations among the four notions of potential games as well as pseudo-potential games.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)58-66
Number of pages9
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume61
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015 Jan 1

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Potential Games
Nash Equilibrium
Pseudopotential
Potential games
Incomplete preferences
Completion
Best response
Cycle

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

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Potential games with incomplete preferences. / Park, Jaeok.

In: Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 61, 01.01.2015, p. 58-66.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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