Abstract
In recent years, to satisfy people's need for wireless services, the number of access points of the 3G-based systems, WiFi and WiMAX has been increased exponentially by wireless service providers (WSPs). As a result, there are many WSPs coexisting in the same hotspot area, which drives price competition among WSPs. Existing researche shows that each WSP will lower its price to increase revenue or market share, and this kind of price competition will eventually damage every WSP with the revenue decrease. However in this paper, we show that there is another type of price competition, where the WSPs' decreasing or increasing price levels occurs periodically and there is no equilibrium point. We illustrate it by using an example of the duopoly price competition and suggest a simple regulation rule that leads to an equilibrium point. Moreover, we show that the equilibrium point is Pareto-optimal and is well balanced in the aspects of total revenue, fairness and social welfare.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | 2011 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM 2011 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2011 Dec 1 |
| Event | 54th Annual IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference: "Energizing Global Communications", GLOBECOM 2011 - Houston, TX, United States Duration: 2011 Dec 5 → 2011 Dec 9 |
Publication series
| Name | GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference |
|---|
Other
| Other | 54th Annual IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference: "Energizing Global Communications", GLOBECOM 2011 |
|---|---|
| Country | United States |
| City | Houston, TX |
| Period | 11/12/5 → 11/12/9 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Cite this
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Price war in wireless access networks : A regulation for convergence. / Yu, Seung Min; Kim, Seong Lyun.
2011 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM 2011. 2011. 6134340 (GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
TY - GEN
T1 - Price war in wireless access networks
T2 - A regulation for convergence
AU - Yu, Seung Min
AU - Kim, Seong Lyun
PY - 2011/12/1
Y1 - 2011/12/1
N2 - In recent years, to satisfy people's need for wireless services, the number of access points of the 3G-based systems, WiFi and WiMAX has been increased exponentially by wireless service providers (WSPs). As a result, there are many WSPs coexisting in the same hotspot area, which drives price competition among WSPs. Existing researche shows that each WSP will lower its price to increase revenue or market share, and this kind of price competition will eventually damage every WSP with the revenue decrease. However in this paper, we show that there is another type of price competition, where the WSPs' decreasing or increasing price levels occurs periodically and there is no equilibrium point. We illustrate it by using an example of the duopoly price competition and suggest a simple regulation rule that leads to an equilibrium point. Moreover, we show that the equilibrium point is Pareto-optimal and is well balanced in the aspects of total revenue, fairness and social welfare.
AB - In recent years, to satisfy people's need for wireless services, the number of access points of the 3G-based systems, WiFi and WiMAX has been increased exponentially by wireless service providers (WSPs). As a result, there are many WSPs coexisting in the same hotspot area, which drives price competition among WSPs. Existing researche shows that each WSP will lower its price to increase revenue or market share, and this kind of price competition will eventually damage every WSP with the revenue decrease. However in this paper, we show that there is another type of price competition, where the WSPs' decreasing or increasing price levels occurs periodically and there is no equilibrium point. We illustrate it by using an example of the duopoly price competition and suggest a simple regulation rule that leads to an equilibrium point. Moreover, we show that the equilibrium point is Pareto-optimal and is well balanced in the aspects of total revenue, fairness and social welfare.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84863173703&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84863173703&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/GLOCOM.2011.6134340
DO - 10.1109/GLOCOM.2011.6134340
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84863173703
SN - 9781424492688
T3 - GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference
BT - 2011 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM 2011
ER -