Price war in wireless access networks: A regulation for convergence

Seung Min Yu, Seong Lyun Kim

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

5 Citations (Scopus)


In recent years, to satisfy people's need for wireless services, the number of access points of the 3G-based systems, WiFi and WiMAX has been increased exponentially by wireless service providers (WSPs). As a result, there are many WSPs coexisting in the same hotspot area, which drives price competition among WSPs. Existing researche shows that each WSP will lower its price to increase revenue or market share, and this kind of price competition will eventually damage every WSP with the revenue decrease. However in this paper, we show that there is another type of price competition, where the WSPs' decreasing or increasing price levels occurs periodically and there is no equilibrium point. We illustrate it by using an example of the duopoly price competition and suggest a simple regulation rule that leads to an equilibrium point. Moreover, we show that the equilibrium point is Pareto-optimal and is well balanced in the aspects of total revenue, fairness and social welfare.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2011 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM 2011
Publication statusPublished - 2011
Event54th Annual IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference: "Energizing Global Communications", GLOBECOM 2011 - Houston, TX, United States
Duration: 2011 Dec 52011 Dec 9

Publication series

NameGLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference


Other54th Annual IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference: "Energizing Global Communications", GLOBECOM 2011
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityHouston, TX

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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