Rational social and political polarization

Daniel J. Singer, Aaron Bramson, Patrick Grim, Bennett Holman, Jiin Jung, Karen Kovaka, Anika Ranginani, William J. Berger

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Public discussions of political and social issues are often characterized by deep and persistent polarization. In social psychology, it’s standard to treat belief polarization as the product of epistemic irrationality. In contrast, we argue that the persistent disagreement that grounds political and social polarization can be produced by epistemically rational agents, when those agents have limited cognitive resources. Using an agent-based model of group deliberation, we show that groups of deliberating agents using coherence-based strategies for managing their limited resources tend to polarize into different subgroups. We argue that using that strategy is epistemically rational for limited agents. So even though group polarization looks like it must be the product of human irrationality, polarization can be the result of fully rational deliberation with natural human limitations.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2243-2267
Number of pages25
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume176
Issue number9
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019 Sep 15

    Fingerprint

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Singer, D. J., Bramson, A., Grim, P., Holman, B., Jung, J., Kovaka, K., Ranginani, A., & Berger, W. J. (2019). Rational social and political polarization. Philosophical Studies, 176(9), 2243-2267. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1124-5