Revenue sharing of ISP and CP in a competitive environment

Nari Im; Jeonghoon Mo; Jungju Park

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-47509-7_11

Revenue sharing of ISP and CP in a competitive environment

Nari Im, Jeonghoon Mo, Jungju Park

Department of Industrial Engineering

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We considered a revenue sharing problem between a content provider (CP) and a Internet service provider (ISP) when two ISPs competes with each other. ISPs can provide a piracy monitoring service, which may increase the profit of CP, to incentivize CP to collaborate with one of them. We modeled the problem as a multi-stage game and characterized an equilbrium content price, piracy monitoring level, and revenue sharing ratio. We found a condition in which ISP and CP may collaborate even under competition. We also provide numerical results.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	113-121
Number of pages	9
Journal	Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST
Volume	174
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47509-7_11
Publication status	Published - 2017 Jan 1

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This work was supported in part by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2012R1A1A2007890).

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Computer Networks and Communications

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-319-47509-7_11

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