Abstract
We considered a revenue sharing problem between a content provider (CP) and a Internet service provider (ISP) when two ISPs competes with each other. ISPs can provide a piracy monitoring service, which may increase the profit of CP, to incentivize CP to collaborate with one of them. We modeled the problem as a multi-stage game and characterized an equilbrium content price, piracy monitoring level, and revenue sharing ratio. We found a condition in which ISP and CP may collaborate even under competition. We also provide numerical results.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 113-121 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST |
| Volume | 174 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2017 Jan 1 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Computer Networks and Communications
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Revenue sharing of ISP and CP in a competitive environment. / Im, Nari; Mo, Jeonghoon; Park, Jungju.
In: Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST, Vol. 174, 01.01.2017, p. 113-121.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Revenue sharing of ISP and CP in a competitive environment
AU - Im, Nari
AU - Mo, Jeonghoon
AU - Park, Jungju
PY - 2017/1/1
Y1 - 2017/1/1
N2 - We considered a revenue sharing problem between a content provider (CP) and a Internet service provider (ISP) when two ISPs competes with each other. ISPs can provide a piracy monitoring service, which may increase the profit of CP, to incentivize CP to collaborate with one of them. We modeled the problem as a multi-stage game and characterized an equilbrium content price, piracy monitoring level, and revenue sharing ratio. We found a condition in which ISP and CP may collaborate even under competition. We also provide numerical results.
AB - We considered a revenue sharing problem between a content provider (CP) and a Internet service provider (ISP) when two ISPs competes with each other. ISPs can provide a piracy monitoring service, which may increase the profit of CP, to incentivize CP to collaborate with one of them. We modeled the problem as a multi-stage game and characterized an equilbrium content price, piracy monitoring level, and revenue sharing ratio. We found a condition in which ISP and CP may collaborate even under competition. We also provide numerical results.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84999009569&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84999009569&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-47509-7_11
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-47509-7_11
M3 - Article
VL - 174
SP - 113
EP - 121
JO - Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
JF - Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
SN - 1867-8211
ER -