This article investigates the Neo-Confucian project of “reverse moral economy,” which aims to restore the ideal congruence between political power and moral virtue, by examining a political debate on the selection of the new Crown Prince and the incumbent ruler’s subsequent abdication that took place in Korea during the formative period of the Chosŏn 朝鮮 dynasty (1392–1910) in light of the so-called “the Mencian trouble,” a compromise between Mencius’ ideal vision of Confucian virtue politics (or moral economy) and his realistic concern with political stability. After discussing how Korean Neo-Confucians were able to justify their choice of a more virtuous candidate in violation of the Lineage Law, which upheld father-son transmission as the constant norm (jing 經), by judiciously balancing (quan 權) between the candidate’s virtue and the incumbent ruler’s recommendation, it articulates the Korean Neo-Confucian project of reverse moral economy from the standpoint of the constitutionality of the new dynasty.
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I am grateful to Youngsun Back , David Kim, and Susan Shim for their valuable comments. Thanks are also due to the journal?s anonymous reviewers as well as from my previous submission. This research was supported by the Korean Studies Grant Program of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2019-R02).
I am grateful to Youngsun B ack , David Kim, and Susan Shim for their valuable comments. Thanks are also due to the journal’s anonymous reviewers as well as from my previous submission. This research was supported by the Korean Studies Grant Program of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2019-R02). Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
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