Abstract
This paper analyzes selection biases in the project choice of complementary technologies that are used in combination to produce a final product. In the presence of complementary technologies, patents allow innovating firms to hold up rivals who succeed in developing other system components. This hold-up makes innovation rewards independent of project difficulties and firms excessively cluster their R&D efforts on a relatively easier technology in order to preemptively claim stakes on component property rights. This selection bias is persistent and robust to several model extensions. Implications for the optimal design of intellectual property rights are discussed.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 899-924 |
| Number of pages | 26 |
| Journal | Journal of Economics and Management Strategy |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2014 Dec 1 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Economics and Econometrics
- Strategy and Management
- Management of Technology and Innovation
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Selection Biases in Complementary R&D Projects. / Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko.
In: Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 23, No. 4, 01.12.2014, p. 899-924.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Selection Biases in Complementary R&D Projects
AU - Choi, Jay Pil
AU - Gerlach, Heiko
PY - 2014/12/1
Y1 - 2014/12/1
N2 - This paper analyzes selection biases in the project choice of complementary technologies that are used in combination to produce a final product. In the presence of complementary technologies, patents allow innovating firms to hold up rivals who succeed in developing other system components. This hold-up makes innovation rewards independent of project difficulties and firms excessively cluster their R&D efforts on a relatively easier technology in order to preemptively claim stakes on component property rights. This selection bias is persistent and robust to several model extensions. Implications for the optimal design of intellectual property rights are discussed.
AB - This paper analyzes selection biases in the project choice of complementary technologies that are used in combination to produce a final product. In the presence of complementary technologies, patents allow innovating firms to hold up rivals who succeed in developing other system components. This hold-up makes innovation rewards independent of project difficulties and firms excessively cluster their R&D efforts on a relatively easier technology in order to preemptively claim stakes on component property rights. This selection bias is persistent and robust to several model extensions. Implications for the optimal design of intellectual property rights are discussed.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84915783975&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/jems.12071
DO - 10.1111/jems.12071
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84915783975
VL - 23
SP - 899
EP - 924
JO - Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
JF - Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
SN - 1058-6407
IS - 4
ER -