“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests

Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Sang Hyun Kim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest. We show that this result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or a sequential loser-elimination mechanism is implemented. We then discuss the optimal allocation of players and prizes among sub-contests.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)486-493
Number of pages8
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume104
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Jul

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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