“Small, yet Beautiful”

Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests

Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Sang-Hyun Kim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest. We show that this result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or a sequential loser-elimination mechanism is implemented. We then discuss the optimal allocation of players and prizes among sub-contests.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)486-493
Number of pages8
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume104
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Jul 1

Fingerprint

Contests
Optimal allocation

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

@article{1a2244a41b294fdea426938061ad7494,
title = "“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests",
abstract = "We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest. We show that this result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or a sequential loser-elimination mechanism is implemented. We then discuss the optimal allocation of players and prizes among sub-contests.",
author = "Chowdhury, {Subhasish M.} and Sang-Hyun Kim",
year = "2017",
month = "7",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012",
language = "English",
volume = "104",
pages = "486--493",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

}

“Small, yet Beautiful” : Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests. / Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Sang-Hyun.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 104, 01.07.2017, p. 486-493.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - “Small, yet Beautiful”

T2 - Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests

AU - Chowdhury, Subhasish M.

AU - Kim, Sang-Hyun

PY - 2017/7/1

Y1 - 2017/7/1

N2 - We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest. We show that this result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or a sequential loser-elimination mechanism is implemented. We then discuss the optimal allocation of players and prizes among sub-contests.

AB - We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest. We show that this result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or a sequential loser-elimination mechanism is implemented. We then discuss the optimal allocation of players and prizes among sub-contests.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85020249299&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85020249299&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012

M3 - Article

VL - 104

SP - 486

EP - 493

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

ER -