Stackelberg contention games in multiuser networks

Jaeok Park, Mihaela Van Der Schaar

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

31 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Interactions among selfish users sharing a common transmission channel can be modeled as a noncooperative game using the game theory framework. When selfish users choose their transmission probabilities independently without any coordination mechanism, Nash equilibria usually result in a network collapse. We propose a methodology that transforms the noncooperative game into a Stackelberg game. Stackelberg equilibria of the Stackelberg game can overcome the deficiency of the Nash equilibria of the original game. A particular type of Stackelberg intervention is constructed to show that any positive payoff profile feasible with independent transmission probabilities can be achieved as a Stackelberg equilibrium payoff profile. We discuss criteria to select an operating point of the network and informational requirements for the Stackelberg game. We relax the requirements and examine the effects of relaxation on performance.

Original languageEnglish
Article number305978
JournalEurasip Journal on Advances in Signal Processing
Volume2009
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009 Jun 15

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Game theory

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Signal Processing
  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

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Stackelberg contention games in multiuser networks. / Park, Jaeok; Van Der Schaar, Mihaela.

In: Eurasip Journal on Advances in Signal Processing, Vol. 2009, 305978, 15.06.2009.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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