Standardization and experimentation

Ex ante vs. ex post standardization

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

20 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper develops a framework to investigate the optimal timing of standardization in which the tradeoff between standardization and experiment is explicitly analyzed. Ex ante standardization ensures early benefits of compatibility while the standard chosen could be a 'wrong' one since the decision is made without precise information about the actual values of potential technologies. Ex post standardization relies on the market mechanism to achieve de facto standardization after experimentation. The advantage of this approach is that the standardization decision can be based on better information about qualities. The cost is the transient loss of compatibility benefit in the experimentation stage. The market outcome is shown to generate too little ex post standardization after experimentation compared with the social optimum. Alternatively, users adopt ex ante standardization too frequently compared with the social optimum.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)273-290
Number of pages18
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
Volume12
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1996 Jan 1

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market mechanism
experiment
market
costs
Values
Experimentation
Standardization
Compatibility
Social optimum

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

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Standardization and experimentation : Ex ante vs. ex post standardization. / Choi, Jay Pil.

In: European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 12, No. 2, 01.01.1996, p. 273-290.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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