Strategic product pre-announcements in markets with network effects

Jay Pil Choi, Eirik Gaard Kristiansen, Jae Nahm

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle


Firms often announce new products well in advance of their actual market availability. The incentives for pre-announcements are conceived to be stronger in markets with network effects because they can be used to induce the delay of consumers purchases and forestall the build-up of rival products installed bases. However, such announcements often are not fulfilled, raising antitrust concerns. We analyze the effects of product pre-announcements in the presence of network effects when firms strategically make false announcements. We also discuss their implications for consumer welfare.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-20
Number of pages20
JournalHitotsubashi Journal of Economics
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2019

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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