Temporal experience and the a versus B debate

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This chapter discusses some aspects of the relation between temporal experience and the A versus B debate. To begin with, I provide an overview of the A versus B debate and, following Baron et al. (2015), distinguish between two B-theoretic responses to the A-theoretic argument from experience, veridicalism and illusionism. I then argue for veridicalism over illusionism, by examining our (putative) experiences as of presentness and as of time passing. I close with some remarks on the relation between veridicalism and a deflationary view of the A versus B debate. I suggest that the deflationary view can provide further support for veridicalism.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience
PublisherTaylor and Francis
Pages239-248
Number of pages10
ISBN (Electronic)9781351979696
ISBN (Print)9781138830745
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Jan 1

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Illusionism

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Deng, N. (2017). Temporal experience and the a versus B debate. In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience (pp. 239-248). Taylor and Francis. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315269641
Deng, Natalja. / Temporal experience and the a versus B debate. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience. Taylor and Francis, 2017. pp. 239-248
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Deng, N 2017, Temporal experience and the a versus B debate. in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience. Taylor and Francis, pp. 239-248. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315269641

Temporal experience and the a versus B debate. / Deng, Natalja.

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience. Taylor and Francis, 2017. p. 239-248.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

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Deng N. Temporal experience and the a versus B debate. In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience. Taylor and Francis. 2017. p. 239-248 https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315269641