The association between foreign directors and opportunistic financial reporting

Jung Hwa Suh, Ho Young Lee, Hansol Lee

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This study examines the effect of foreign directors in the board of directors on the monitoring function by analyzing the association between foreign directors and opportunistic financial reporting. The authors address this question by examining the effect of the foreign directors in the board on firms’ discretionary accruals and book-tax difference. The researchers analyze by using Korean firm data for the years 2001–2014 as Korea is one of the few countries that nepotism is strong within the board, providing the ideal setting to analyze the effect of foreign directors on the monitoring function of the board. The authors find that foreign directors have a positive effect on the monitoring function of the board, as discretionary accruals and book-tax differences of firms with foreign directors are lower than those without foreign directors. Further, the researchers find that the positive effect of foreign directors on the monitoring function is more pronounced if foreign directors are independent directors or expertise in accounting or finance. Overall, the findings support the view that foreign directors in the board increase the board diversity, which increases the independence of the board and so the monitoring function.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)98-112
Number of pages15
JournalInvestment Management and Financial Innovations
Volume15
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Jan 1

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business and International Management
  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Strategy and Management

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