The economics of repeated extortion

Jay Pil Choi, Marcel Thum

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

20 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We provide a simple model of repeated extortion. In particular, we ask whether corrupt government officials' opportunism to demand more once entrepreneurs have made sunk investments entails further distortion in resource allocations. If the choice of technology is left to the entrepreneurs, the dynamic path of demand schedules will induce entrepreneurs to pursue a "fly-by-night" strategy by adopting a technology with an inefficiently low sunk cost component. The unique equilibrium is characterized by a mixed strategy of the government official in future demand. Our model thus explains why arbitrariness is such a central feature of extortion. We also investigate implications of the stability of corrupt regimes for dynamic extortion and discuss alternative applications for our framework.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)203-223
Number of pages21
JournalRAND Journal of Economics
Volume35
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2004 Jan 1

Fingerprint

Economics
Extortion
Entrepreneurs
Government
Sunk costs
Resource allocation
Mixed strategy
Schedule
Opportunism

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Choi, Jay Pil ; Thum, Marcel. / The economics of repeated extortion. In: RAND Journal of Economics. 2004 ; Vol. 35, No. 2. pp. 203-223.
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The economics of repeated extortion. / Choi, Jay Pil; Thum, Marcel.

In: RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 35, No. 2, 01.01.2004, p. 203-223.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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