Abstract
Scholars and practitioners debate whether to expand the scope of the right to be forgotten—the right to have certain links removed from search results—to encompass global search results. The debate centers on the assumption that the expansion will increase the incidence of link removal, which reinforces privacy while hampering free speech. We develop a game-theoretic model to show that the expansion of the right to be forgotten can reduce the incidence of link removal. We also show that the expansion does not necessarily enhance the welfare of individuals who request removal and that it can either improve or reduce societal welfare. Our analysis has implications for understanding the impact of the global expansion of the right to be forgotten on privacy and free speech.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 335-360 |
| Number of pages | 26 |
| Journal | Journal of Law and Economics |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2017 May |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economics and Econometrics
- Law
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The economics of the right to be forgotten. / Kim, Byung Cheol; Kim, Jin Yeub.
In: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 60, No. 2, 05.2017, p. 335-360.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - The economics of the right to be forgotten
AU - Kim, Byung Cheol
AU - Kim, Jin Yeub
PY - 2017/5
Y1 - 2017/5
N2 - Scholars and practitioners debate whether to expand the scope of the right to be forgotten—the right to have certain links removed from search results—to encompass global search results. The debate centers on the assumption that the expansion will increase the incidence of link removal, which reinforces privacy while hampering free speech. We develop a game-theoretic model to show that the expansion of the right to be forgotten can reduce the incidence of link removal. We also show that the expansion does not necessarily enhance the welfare of individuals who request removal and that it can either improve or reduce societal welfare. Our analysis has implications for understanding the impact of the global expansion of the right to be forgotten on privacy and free speech.
AB - Scholars and practitioners debate whether to expand the scope of the right to be forgotten—the right to have certain links removed from search results—to encompass global search results. The debate centers on the assumption that the expansion will increase the incidence of link removal, which reinforces privacy while hampering free speech. We develop a game-theoretic model to show that the expansion of the right to be forgotten can reduce the incidence of link removal. We also show that the expansion does not necessarily enhance the welfare of individuals who request removal and that it can either improve or reduce societal welfare. Our analysis has implications for understanding the impact of the global expansion of the right to be forgotten on privacy and free speech.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85032705642&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85032705642&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1086/694254
DO - 10.1086/694254
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85032705642
VL - 60
SP - 335
EP - 360
JO - Journal of Law and Economics
JF - Journal of Law and Economics
SN - 0022-2186
IS - 2
ER -