This research explores the determinants of organizational performance, focusing on executive selection factors. Despite the growth of public sector organizations in various policy fields, there have been few empirical studies of the relationship between executive selection and performance. Using the panel data from 1999 to 2007 of 13 quasi-governmental Korean organizations classified as government corporations, this research examines how politicization of boards, chief executive succession, and insider/outsider origin of chief executives affect organizational performance as measured by two indicators, the Performance Evaluation Index (PEI) and the Consumer Satisfaction Index (CSI). The results demonstrate that board politicization and chief executive succession have a significantly positive effect on the PEI, whereas the CSI is largely determined by contextual factors, such as presidential change and unemployment rate. Financial support from the government shows consistent influence on both performance indicators.
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
significant sign of government funding implies that a higher funding proportion from government helps improve performance in spite of the potential negativity coming from heavy reliance on government. This result supports the importance of a stable resource stream, as shown in previous studies (e.g., boyne, 2003; brewer & Selden, 2000). Since performance evaluation includes the overall achievement of the planned objectives, financial support from the government seems essential to improving the effectiveness of the primary activities of function, efficiency of management, and outcome of the activities. Particularly for quangos responsible for stable provision of public services, government funding works as a stable source for sustainability.
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Public Administration
- Strategy and Management