There is now a general consensus amongst philosophers in the values in science literature that values necessarily play a role in core areas of scientific inquiry. We argue that attention should now be turned from debating the value-free ideal to delineating legitimate from illegitimate influences of values in science, a project we dub “The New Demarcation Problem.” First, we review past attempts to demarcate the uses of values and propose a categorization of the strategies by where they seek to draw legitimacy from. Next, we propose a set of desiderata for what we take to be a satisfactory solution and present a case study where conflicting sets of values clearly impinge on science, but where the legitimacy of their influence is ambiguous. We use these desiderata and the case study to illustrate what we take to be the strengths and weaknesses of current strategies. To be clear, our goal is not to answer the question we pose, but to articulate a framework within which a solution can be judged.
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
We would like to thank the participants of an online Work-in-Progress meeting of the Socially Engaged Philosophy of Science (SEPOS) group at Michigan State University as well as two anonymous reviewers for this journal for constructive criticism and valuable comments.
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- History and Philosophy of Science