US foreign aid and economic policy concessions*

Taehee Whang, Youngwan Kim, Jung Taek Han, Hannah June Kim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Why do donors continue to provide foreign aid despite its failure to help poor countries over the past several decades? While some scholars argue that foreign aid is purely for humanitarian purposes, others assert that such aid serves as a tool to pressure recipient countries into accepting policy concessions. In this study, we subject these arguments to empirical testing using a dataset that integrates the amount of US aid and economic policies of recipient countries for 1995–2012. The findings suggest that aid decisions correspond to the interests of the United States, such as policy concessions in economic and business liberalization. However, an increase in US aid is not directly associated with further economic reforms in recipient countries. We conclude that US foreign aid programmes are strategic in nature and successful not in alleviating economic problems in recipient countries but, at the very least, in buying their policy compliance.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)58-79
Number of pages22
JournalPolicy Studies
Volume40
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019 Jan 2

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concession
Economic Policy
recipient
decision aid
economic reform
liberalization
economics

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

Whang, Taehee ; Kim, Youngwan ; Han, Jung Taek ; Kim, Hannah June. / US foreign aid and economic policy concessions* In: Policy Studies. 2019 ; Vol. 40, No. 1. pp. 58-79.
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US foreign aid and economic policy concessions* . / Whang, Taehee; Kim, Youngwan; Han, Jung Taek; Kim, Hannah June.

In: Policy Studies, Vol. 40, No. 1, 02.01.2019, p. 58-79.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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