User subscription dynamics and revenue maximization in communications markets

Shaolei Ren, Jaeok Park, Mihaela Van Der Schaar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

22 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In order to understand the complex interactions between different technologies in a communications market, it is of fundamental importance to understand how technologies affect the demand of users and competition between network service providers (NSPs). To this end, we analyze user subscription dynamics and revenue maximization in monopoly and duopoly communications markets. First, by considering a monopoly market with only one NSP, we investigate the impact of technologies on the users' dynamic subscription. It is shown that, for any price charged by the NSP, there exists a unique equilibrium point of the considered user subscription dynamics. We also provide a sufficient condition under which the user subscription dynamics converges to the equilibrium point starting from any initial point. We then derive upper and lower bounds on the optimal price and market share that maximize the NSP's revenue. Next, we turn to the analysis of a duopoly market and show that, for any charged prices, the equilibrium point of the considered user subscription dynamics exists and is unique. As in a monopoly market, we derive a sufficient condition on the technologies of the NSPs that ensures the user subscription dynamics to reach the equilibrium point. Then, we model the NSP competition using a non-cooperative game, in which the two NSPs choose their market shares independently, and provide a sufficient condition that guarantees the existence of at least one pure Nash equilibrium in the market competition game.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2011 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM
Pages2696-2704
Number of pages9
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011
EventIEEE INFOCOM 2011 - Shanghai, China
Duration: 2011 Apr 102011 Apr 15

Publication series

NameProceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
ISSN (Print)0743-166X

Other

OtherIEEE INFOCOM 2011
CountryChina
CityShanghai
Period11/4/1011/4/15

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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