What quine (and carnap) might say about contemporary metaphysics of time

This chapter explores the relations between Quine’s and Carnap’s metaontological stances on the one hand, and contemporary work in the metaphysics of time on the other. Contemporary metaphysics of time, like analytic metaphysics in general, grew out of the revival of the discipline that Quine’s critique of the logical empiricists made possible. At the same time, the metaphysics of time has in some respects strayed far from its Quinean roots. This chapter examines some likely Quinean and Carnapian reactions to elements of the contemporary scene. The main claim is that contemporary temporal metaphysics is characterized by a degree of metaphysical seriousness that goes beyond anything found in either Carnap or Quine. The chapter also suggests that there are affinities between Carnapian approaches to temporal ontology and deflationary attitudes towards the question of whether time passes.